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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (17 Sep 68) FOR OT RD 682128

20 September 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, Period Ending 30 Apr 68 (U)

AD39270

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Kenneth G. Wickham

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 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry

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HEADQUARTERS

7TH ARMORED SQUADRON, 1ST AIR CAVALRY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96289

30 April 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April, 1968, RGS CSFOR-65 (R1)

1. Section I, Operations:

A. Significant Activities:

(1) Personnel:

(a) The 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry was activated under the provisions of General Orders Number 59 USAARMC 21 April 1967 and TOE 17-95T dtd 25 April, 1967. LTC Charles E. Canedy, 068937, assumed command of the Squadron on 3 July 1967 and received the Squadron colors from COL George E. Handley, Commanding Officer, USAARMC Aviation Group (Prov) in a ceremony conducted at Brooks Field, Fort Knox, Kentucky on the same date.

(b) During the early organization of the Squadron, many problem areas were encountered in the assignment of officers. Many of the officers assigned from Fort Rucker, Alabama came to the Squadron through Fort Knox, Kentucky, USAARMC POC1 Squadron and Detachment, through Headquarters, Special Troops USAARMC Fort Knox, Kentucky, and through Aviation Group (Prov) Fort Knox, Kentucky before actually being assigned to the squadron. On many occasions the officer was present for duty for as much as 30 days before orders came down. This occurred as late as two months after the Personnel on Station Date.

(c) Another area in which problems existed was the assignment of key staff and troop command personnel. The squadron began actual organization approximately 45 days prior to POSD. As of the POSD many of the key staff and troop command positions were vacant or being filled by lower officer or enlisted grades. By the POSD much of the ground work in the organization of the Squadron had already commenced and was well underway. Upon arrival of key staff and troop command personnel many policies previously effected by personnel filling the various positions were changed by the more experienced personnel.

(d) This unit benefited considerably by being able to utilize the knowledge passed on from two other similar units that had deployed, with reference to personnel problems that could be expected. Close liaison was maintained with the other two units preparing for deployment on a wide variety of subjects on personnel and related problem areas. Early in the activation stages personnel were being assigned rather smoothly. Approximately midway through the PRD the assignment of enlisted personnel

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began to become of great concern to all commanders, unit leaders and section chiefs to obtain personnel to fill existing vacancies.

(e) A problem area on assignment of enlisted personnel was "no show" individuals. Hundreds of messages and orders were received reflecting the assignment of personnel. A very large percentage of the names received were later deleted from assignment for various reasons. These deletions created confusion and delay of new names and actual assignments. The reporting channels of controlling assignments caused considerable confusion and loss of continuity. The squadron was required to go through the local Personnel Service Company, Post AG Personnel, 1st US Army and DA level. As a result the accountability by all parties concerned did not always agree.

(f) A large portion of confusion and delay of personnel being assigned was due to losing commands failure to promptly notify DA. Correspondingly, losing commanders should inform the Squadron as to the non-availability of men who had been selected but for some reason could not comply with assignment instructions. A large percentage of men were assigned to the Squadron and subsequently lost due to failure of losing commands to comply with all appropriate directives. These are the individuals that created the multitudes of personnel actions. This unit was able to cope with the situation due to being warned in advance as to expectations. By using a tight suspension control system, the man hours expended on a majority of cases were held to a minimum. However, other administrative areas suffered as a result of the time consuming effort devoted by this particular area.

(g) This unit experienced several critical shortages up through deployment in the assignment of personnel to fill existing vacancies particularly in the MOS's of 67W, 31G, 11B, and 11D in skill digit 40.

(h) It was determined that the turn-over of personnel to and from Vietnam whose names were being tagged for assignment to the Squadron, and later deleted, was the one area effecting all deploying units.

(i) This unit was assigned a 14 man personnel section upon arrival in country. The personnel were MOS qualified and were able to provide the Squadron outstanding support from the onset. The unit finance records were brought with the advance party, enabling the Personnel Section to prepare the unit payroll prior to the main body's arrival. It would have been advantageous to have had the personnel section assigned prior to deployment. Many of the immediate reports due upon arrival in country could have been prepared on the troop ship by the personnel section. There was no space available to airlift the personnel records with the advance party. Therefore, the personnel records were shipped with the main body.

(j) Shortly after arrival it was determined that this unit would receive the AH-1G Cobra aircraft. It was anticipated that the qualified personnel assigned for operation of this aircraft would assist the unit infusion program considerably. The direct exchange of UH-1C pilots and crew chiefs for the AH-1G pilots and crew chiefs was not as beneficial as expected. Approximately 50% of the Cobra personnel gained had the same DEROS as the UH-1C personnel departing. Seventeen Cobra qualified pilots were

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received through replacement channels which enabled other officers and warrant officers to be used in positions which previously had been vacant.

(k) Again the Squadron was able to benefit considerably from the knowledge and experience gained by 3/17 Air Cavalry already in country. Policies concerning casualty reporting, awards & decorations, civilian personnel, recurring reports, and infusion were initially taken from 3/17 Cavalry SOP's and Memorandums.

(l) A vigorous infusion program has been established in accordance with USARV Reg 614-9. As of 30 April the infusion program is on schedule.

(m) The Squadron has established a rest and recuperation policy in accordance with USARV Reg 28-5. Quotas have been received and action is being taken to insure maximum utilization of available quotas.

(n) During the reporting period, awards and decorations have been recommended and approved as follows:

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>	<u>PENDING</u>	<u>APPROVED</u>
DSC	0	0	0
SS	5	1	4
DFC	14	12	2
SM	0	0	0
BS "W"	10	7	3
AM "V"	4	4	0
LM	1	1	0
BS	3	3	0
AM	117	76	41
ACM	2	2	0
PH	74	47	27
CIB	182	182	0
CMB	12	12	0

(o) The morale of the troops have been consistently high in spite of a heavy work load and numerous rapid moves. This is attributed to positive leadership by officer and senior NCO's, a vigorous awards and decorations program, a keen sense of unit pride and a stern disciplinary program. Esprit de Corps was boosted through the establishment of distinctive insignia; such as Cavalry hats, spurs, "Blackhawk patches", 7/1 Cav color brass, and scarves for the rifle platoons and D Troop.

(2) Operations

(a) Upon activation of the Squadron on 25 April 1967, the personnel available at Fort Knox began preparation of a Squadron Training Program, designed to mold this Squadron into a combat-ready unit for deployment to RVN. The Program was designed to provide training in four phases as follows:

- 1 Advanced Individual Training
- 2 Basic Unit Training
- 3 Advanced Unit Training *3*
- 4 FMX's and Gunnery

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(b) The Advanced Individual phase was conducted from 24 July to 21 August 1967. During this period, the individual troops received all necessary training required to review basic subjects for each individual as well as orientation toward the Air Cavalry concept.

(c) The Basic Unit Training phase began on 21 August and ran through 18 September, 1967. The majority of officers and non-commissioned officers were present for BUT. During the phase some difficulty was encountered in securing adequate training facilities to meet the requirements for the Squadron. Training areas were too small and classrooms were not available. A problem was expected for Advanced Unit Training in the same areas. Steps were taken to secure all off-post and on-post training areas available. Use of training areas located some distance from the Squadron Base Camp provided excellent training for Air Cav Troops in such areas as route reconnaissance and convoy cover, while the ground troop received excellent training in convoy escort, security, and route reconnaissance.

(d) The Advanced Unit Training phase took place from 18 September until 16 October, 1967. Initially, each troop utilized ground troops from Delta Troop as aggressors. A great deal of valuable training was obtained due to the similarity of the terrain to RVN. During the latter part of AUT, the ground troop aggressed against the ARP's while scouts and gunships supported overhead.

(e) FTX's and Gunnery began on 16 October and ran through 30 November, 1967. During this period, the Squadron conducted several FTX's. In this phase all elements of the Squadron were exercised to the fullest extent in preparing for the ATT 17-95 as well as attaining a fully combat-ready status prior to departure. Problems were encountered due to the lack of necessary equipment, primarily communication equipment and logistical support. The 54th Infantry Battalion supported the Squadron FTX with a company of aggressors and can attest to the vicious ground attack launched by Delta Troop, who over-ran their base camp and captured a platoon of PW's. The hi-point of training during this period was the coordination and cooperation in executing the assigned mission. Each individual put forth his best effort knowing the next problem would be the testing ground of all the hard work during the complete cycle. However, the Squadron quickly realized it was not equipped to operate as an independent unit, especially in the field of logistics and security when establishing a base camp.

(f) Squadron ATT 17-95 was scheduled for 1-4 December, 1967. The Armor Center Aviation Group (Prov) administered the Army Training Test on the Fort Knox Reservation. Adverse weather conditions hindered the operations after the first day. The problem continued on as a map exercise for a period of twelve hours before continuing tactical operations. Emphasis was placed on troop and Squadron command post operations with particular emphasis on intelligence gathering and reporting techniques, maintenance and logistics. Each troop was evaluated by Group umpires and the Squadron was awarded an overall rating of excellent. The primary areas of difficulty encountered during the ATT were command and control. This was mainly due to the limited FM capabilities in the Troop and Squadron C&C ships.

(g) The preparations for the Overseas Movement Phase began on 5 December, 1967. This period included completion of POR/POM requirements,

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weapons qualification, AGI & CMMI conducted by US Army Armor Center, as well as packing and crating of all equipment for shipment overseas. The primary problem encountered during the preparation for movement was POR/POM difficulties caused by last minute assignment of personnel who were not POR/POM qualified.

(h) The Squadron received unexpected as well as unusual training while in the process of ferrying their aircraft from Fort Knox, Kentucky to Stockton, California. While enroute, stormy weather was experienced in Arizona and the Squadron pilots made excellent use of the snowbound conditions in assisting the Navajo Indians who were isolated due to deep snow. Resupply and evacuation experience was gained during this period.

(i) The Squadron main body departed CONUS from Long Beach, California, on 1 February, 1968, on the USNS UPHUR. Review type training in basic subjects and physical training was conducted aboard ship. Limited facilities and crowded conditions reduced the effectiveness of training. Vietnam orientations and first aid were the most beneficial training conducted.

(j) The advance party departed Fort Knox, Kentucky on 9 February, 1968 on an Air Force C-141. The advance party arrived at Di An, the designated base camp for the Squadron, on 11 February 1968. The advance party was composed of representatives from each troop and staff section, consisting of 46 officers and enlisted men. They established liaison with the 1st Infantry Division Support Command at Di An. The area designated was previously occupied by the 3/17 ACS. The unit started establishing a base camp to include renovation and repairing previously built tent frames.

(k) One of the Squadron's first areas of importance was to coordinate for in-country training as well as to establish instructor pilots and standardization pilots to assist the new aviators with their in-country qualification. Direct coordination was made with units in the 12th Combat Aviation Group throughout the III CTZ for the purpose of placing aviators with units to receive in-country orientation training. Squadron pilots received training with the following units:

3/17 Air Cavalry Squadron
11th Aviation Battalion
145th Aviation Battalion
269th Aviation Battalion

(l) In-country training for ground elements and administrative personnel was conducted by the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and 1st Division Support Command. The final exercise was the actual setting up of an ambush patrol in the vicinity of Di An. The practical experience gained has paid dividends in that Delta Troop has netted as many as 20 Viet Cong KIA and 11 AK-47's captured in one ambush.

(m) The Squadron exercise scheduled between 17 March and 22 March, 1968 in the vicinity of Lai Khe was cancelled due to the non-availability of Cobra aircraft. The change from the UH-1C to the AH-1G delayed the progress of the Squadron operational status due to the lack of qualified pilots and maintenance personnel as well as parts and experience on the new aircraft.

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(n) On 22 March, A & B Troops were OPCON to the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division for Operation ALCORN COVE. Operation ALCORN COVE was conducted in the area northwest of Lai Khe. The Air Cav troops performed visual reconnaissance in the AO for the 3d Brigade and had a secondary mission of supporting units in contact on order. The Air Cav Troops gained valuable knowledge and experience in the operation. The troops operated daily out of Di An utilizing the facilities available at night to maintain the aircraft. A forward CP for Squadron as well as each troop proved most effective in working with the Brigade. The troops recognized many of the new problem areas incurred by the use of the AH-1G, particularly in the turn around time of the aircraft when rearming was required. The tactics were evaluated and researched for the proper altitude and attitude of the gunships in order that they were able to cover the OH-6A on its tree-top VR at all times during operations. This operation gave the Squadron its first experience in combat and better prepared them for the future.

(o) C Troop was OPCON to the 9th Infantry Division effective 17 March in the III Corps area. The Air Cav troop worked daily out of Di An working in Brigade areas in the Delta. The troop also gained valuable experience and proved to be very successful as their results depicted. Their problems remained primarily similar to those found by the two Air Cav troops at Lai Khe. The terrain proved to be much more favorable for the insertion of ground elements of platoon size force.

(p) D Troop was OPCON to the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at Di An and operated primarily in the Brigade AO at Thu Due and at the water plant. The experience and training gained on night operations to include ambush patrols and thunder runs was invaluable. After one week of operations with the 1/18 Infantry at the water point, the troop moved two platoons back to Di An where they were assigned their own AO to operate both day and night operations using Di An as a base of operations. Their ambush patrols proved very valuable as depicted in their locating of a 82mm mortar as well as numerous quantities of rice, clothing and other supplies northeast of Di An.

(q) The Squadron received an 82mm mortar attack on 3 April resulting in 1 US KIA and 14 US WIA from B Troop, 7/1st ACS. The personnel received their injuries when rounds came through the top of the billeting tent while some were hit by shrapnel while running to bunkers just outside of the tent entrance. Personnel billets were moved immediately upon the request of the Squadron Commander to a billeting area more distant from the aircraft, which appeared to be the primary target on all mortar attacks.

(r) On 17 April the Squadron minus C Troop began participating in Operation TOAN THANG, OPCON to 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in the area south of Phuc Vinh. Again the Squadron operated daily from Di An and found it more practical to leave forward CP's at Di An. Minor problems arose as to reporting procedures and on numerous occasions spot reports would not reach Squadron from the originator. It was also realized that fire teams could not be dispatched separately for units in contact and still enable the Cav Troops to operate their VR with organic weapons support. The utilization of fire teams had to be restricted to enable the troops to perform their primary mission as an Air Cav Troop. Delta Troop operated primarily on 60 man night ambush sites and proved very successful in their results. The large ambush patrol was inserted late each afternoon utilizing

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the lift aircraft from A & B Troops. This operation consisted of an insertion of one of the ARP's prior to the D Troop patrol being inserted with 8 aircraft. The patrol would then be inserted utilizing the same 8 aircraft. This would be followed by two or three false insertions at nearby locations just prior to darkness. At dusk the lift element would give the impression of extraction by picking up the original ARP and depart the area leaving a 60 man ambush patrol concealed in the area of operation. The success of Delta Troop was best exemplified at XT946311 on the evening of 21 April when their ambush resulted in 20 KIA (VC) and 11 AK-47 weapons captured. These results were commended highly by the Commanding General, MACV, 1st Infantry Division Commanding General, Major General Kieth L. Ward, and General William C. Westmoreland, as one of the most successful ambush operations conducted by an element in the Republic of Vietnam. See Inc 3.

(s) On 17 April, C Troop moved by convoy and air to Vinh Long as a permanent move. Vehicles moved on two days and the Air Cav Troops remained operational throughout the move to the 9th Infantry Division.

(t) From 22-25 April, 1968 the Squadron minus continued support of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, with one Air Cav Troop daily. One troop stood-down for maintenance required on the aircraft as well as to meet the requirements for maintenance stand-down established by the 1st Aviation Brigade. Delta Troop on 24 April again completed a successful ambush patrol at XT942229 when their ambush netted 6 VC KIA, 2 weapons and numerous documents captured. See Inc 4.

(u) On the 26th of April the Squadron minus terminated operation TOAN THANG and placed one Air Cav Troop with the 2d Brigade and the 3d Brigade. A Troop continued operations with 3d Brigade in the Lai Khe area while B & D Troops returned OPCON to the 2d Brigade at Di An. All troops with the exception of C Troop worked daily from Di An. During these operations, the Air Cavalry Troop continued to utilize air strikes extensively to assist their operations. The strikes on many occasions proved very effective against areas too well fortified for organic weapons to destroy as well as opening up bunker complexes. A Troop utilized air strikes at XT6640 to uncover what was believed to be an ammunition or chemical factory. Numerous fifty-five gallon drums were uncovered and there were many secondary explosions. On many occasions the Squadron found the need to assist units in contact, with a med-evac capability. On one occasion at XT661451, 7 US WIA were med-evacuated by Scout ships which were the only aircraft capable of assisting due to the heavy jungle undergrowth.

(v) Troop C, continuing their operations in the Delta, maintained a high kill ratio when on one occasion they engaged and killed 12 VC by body count running in the open.

(w) From the 28th to the 30th of April, the Squadron continued in their operational areas. On the 29th of April, a B Troop scout aircraft was shot down at XS992937. The pilot was evacuated, however, the observer could not be reached prior to the aircraft totally burning. On 29 April the Squadron minus conducted an operation with Delta Troop sweeping a suspected resupply area after a night ambush site nearby at XS0200. As Delta Troop swept through the woods and villages, B Troop screened the

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southern flank. Delta Troop made contact with an unknown number of VC while swooping and sustained 5 US WIA to include the Troop Commander. They did succeed in obtaining 4 VC KIA body count, 4 weapons and large quantities of rice captured. This was the largest number of casualties, although all minor, sustained by the Squadron in any one operation to date. The effectiveness of the intelligence information gathered and reported in conjunction with the success of the scouts and gunships greatly enhanced the operational relationship between the Squadron and the 1st Infantry Division. The working relationship improves and becomes more productive daily.

(x) A chart of cumulative results for the Squadron is attached as Table to Incl 1.

(y) The breakdown of the reporting period is as follows:

orintation) 172 days.
1 Training days (to include activations and in-country
2 Troop Movemont - 82 days.
3 Operational - 40 days.
TOTAL DAYS - 301.

(3) Intelligence

(a) The primary emphasis in the intelligence field prior to deployment was centered on the processing of security clearances and the acquisition of adequate map coverage for training in CONUS as well as the initial issue of maps used in RVN.

(b) The Squadron experienced difficulty in acquiring adequate maps for training in CONUS due to the nonavailability of tactical maps for areas not designated as military reservations. This difficulty was partly overcome by the acquisition of Goodotic Survey 1:24,000 maps for use during Squadron training at Green Reservoir, Camp Atterbury and various leased sites throughout Central and Southern Kentucky. The maps did not have grid lines, however, the 3rd and 7th Squadrons, 17th Air Cavalry devised a system, using a template to place grid lines on the maps thus making them suitable for use in military training operations.

(c) After Arrival In-Country

1 The S-2 deployed with the advance party and thus was able to establish liaison with all necessary intelligence agencies prior to the arrival of the main body. The early liaison proved helpful in developing an initial intelligence estimate in the proposed areas of operation for the Squadron.

2 Another area in which the necessary coordination was made prior to the arrival of the Squadron was the acquisition of maps. Maps of the entire III CTZ and half of the IV CTZ were requisitioned and on hand when the Squadron arrived. This made it possible to begin immediately standardization, orientation and familiarization training for aviators.

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3 A request for an interpreter team to assist the Squadron in gathering and evaluating intelligence was submitted through channels in April 1968. To date the Squadron has used the IPW teams assigned to the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division located at Di An Base Camp where the Squadron was stationed.

4 VC battle losses:

a In support of the 1st Infantry Division 22 March through 30 April 1968.

VC/NVA KIA (Body Count)	136
Structures Destroyed	127
Sampans Destroyed	7

b In support of the 9th Infantry Division 22 March through 30 April 1968.

VC/NVA KIA (Body Count)	173
Structures Destroyed	15
Sampans Destroyed	3

(4) Safety

(a) The accident prevention program instituted upon activation of the Squadron continues. Increased command emphasis and successful coupling with the programs of the 12th Combat Aviation Group has significantly reduced the Squadron's accident rate during the last part of the reporting period. A continued emphasis by this command on safety is expected to further reduce the future accident rate.

(5) Logistics and Transportation:

(a) During the initial stages of activation and organization the primary difficulty was the lack of experienced supply and maintenance personnel. This created a more serious problem in maintenance because of the lack of experienced supervisors to properly direct the newly school trained personnel. The lack of experienced records clerks also created problems in properly maintaining stock records, PLL's, and other supply and maintenance records.

(b) The unit deployed to Vietnam without all of its 3/4 ton trucks, radios, 1/4 and 2 1/2 ton trucks, body armor, some sizes of flak vests, and air compressors. The assignment of equipment new to the supply system such as the OH-6A and the M274A2 Mule caused delays in repair because repair parts were not readily available. Most of the TOE equipment arrived after the training program was half completed. It is unrealistic to train with simulated equipment. When the equipment did arrive, maximum utilization of it was made. The arrival of .38 caliber pistols in December required the qualification firing to be completed before the personnel armed with it could depart on Christmas leave.

(c) The sequence of arrival of equipment tools, and personnel created additional problems. In many cases equipment was received without

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the tools to maintain it, such as OH-6A but no OH-6A mechanics tool kits. There were no 3/4 ton trucks to transport the D Troop Rifle Squads. Some test sets arrived just prior to packing for deployment. The availability of only one small mess hall in the billet area presented problems in establishing an adequate feeding plan.

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(d) The lack of authorized 2 1/2 ton trucks in each troop also caused many transportation problems. At Fort Knox the billet area was 2 1/2 miles from the airfield and much farther from the Training Areas. The five (5) mess trucks were always busy as well as the ammo and supply trucks. This left only 1/4 tons and 3/4 tons to transport troops. Some training areas would be ten (10) miles from the one the next class on train was scheduled. This created delays in training and extra use of 3/4 tons and 1/4 tons. The few 3/4 tons at Fort Knox were on loan from the National Guard Equipment pool and were very old and unreliable. This caused additional delays in training. The MTOE pending at DA includes a request for additional 2 1/2 and 5 ton trucks.

(e) Although a Movement Control Officer was established early there was not sufficient time to properly pack for deployment. The Squadron ATT was completed on 4 December, 1967. The aircraft were then stood-down for required maintenance for deployment until 13 December, 1967. The aircraft were ferried to Sharp Army Depot between 13 and 21 December, 1967. After the aircraft departed, the packing of the aircraft maintenance equipment was completed. The conox's departed on flattops on 3 January, 1968. This meant that the Movement Control personnel as well as many detail personnel could not take either Christmas or New Years leave. This was a serious morale factor. By scheduling the conox departure on 15 January, 1968, these personnel could have been granted leave.

2. Section II, Lessons Learned

A. Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

(1) Personnel

(a) Assignment of Officers

1 Observation: Officers were not directly assigned to the Squadron from their previous stations.

2 Evaluation: Incoming officers were assigned indirectly to the Squadron through USAARMC POOL Squadron, Headquarters Special Troops USAARMC, and Aviation Group (Prov) Fort Knox, Kentucky. Assignment orders were delayed in several instances for periods of 6 - 8 weeks.

3 Recommendation: Action be taken to insure incoming officer personnel be assigned directly to the activated unit.

(b) Late Assignment of Key Personnel

1 Observation: Assignment of NCO's in key positions (11B40, 76Y40, 67W20, 31G40) did not take place until December and January 1968, although the POSD was 15 August, 1967. This unit deployed with a

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shortage of 17 11B40 and 11D40 E5's and E6's and 3 67W20 F6's.

2 Evaluation: Personnel shortages in key slots such as Infantry and Scout Squad Leaders, Gunnery Chiefs, Supply Sergeants and Aircraft Technical Inspectors critically affect the Squadron effort to conduct an effective training period.

2 Recommendation: That personnel be assigned to critical slots designated above upon activation of a unit in order to conduct an effective training program.

(c) Non-Deployable Personnel

1 Observation: Between 40 and 50 personnel assigned to the ~~Squadron~~ applied for deferment or reassignment upon assignment to the unit.

2 Evaluation: The time devoted to processing the paper-work required for these requests far exceeded the time devoted to any other personnel activity. The unit was not equipped to handle the additional administrative workload and properly organize an administrative headquarters.

2 Recommendation: Incoming personnel be properly screened prior to assignment to the activating unit by the supporting unit AG.

(d) Personnel Section

1 Observation: A Squadron Personnel Section consisting of 1 Warrant Officer and 13 Enlisted personnel was assigned upon the unit's arrival in country.

2 Evaluation: Many personnel reports were due immediately upon arrival in country. Also the turbulence of personnel immediately prior to deployment required a complete revision of personnel rosters, MOS inventory, and other related reports. These reports could have been completed on board the transport ship had qualified personnel been assigned.

2 Recommendation: That the Personnel Section be assigned prior to deployment.

(e) KD-RL Team

1 Observation: To date the 62 man KD-RL maintenance teams for each troop have not been assigned.

2 Evaluation: Many of the maintenance problems during the training phase at Fort Knox and like problems upon arrival in country were a direct result of inadequate availability of proper maintenance support. The assignment of a maintenance support team to each troop prior to the training period at Fort Knox would have added considerable flexibility to the Squadron Training Program. Upon arrival in country the Air Cavalry Troops have been OPCON to Infantry Brigades at considerable distances from the Squadron Maintenance Support area.

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3 Recommendation: That the Air Cavalry Troops receive the 62 man KD-RL teams upon activation.

(2) Operations

(a) Employment of Fire Teams

1 Observation: Fire teams cannot be scrambled to assist units in contact and still have the Squadron conduct its assigned VR with organic fire teams.

2 Evaluation: The Squadron is a self-sufficient unit and employs the scouts and weapons simultaneously to conduct their primary mission of VR. When a fire team is dispatched by a unit to assist another element in contact, the capability of the cav troop to conduct a VR is eliminated. Scout ships cannot adequately VR at treetop level and develop a situation without the organic fire teams at altitude working directly as a joint team.

3 Recommendation: When the Squadron is OPCON to a unit, the understanding should be established that the Cav Troop cannot provide individual fire teams and still utilize the Cav Troop as its missions require. Fire Teams should be obtained from other sources which would enable the Cav Troop to provide its primary missions of VR or screening.

(b) Employment of the ARP

1 Observation: The rifle platoon in the air cav troop is not a large enough force to commit as a ground element in many cases.

2 Evaluation: The insertion of a rifle platoon in most areas is not adequate enough size to cope with any sizable enemy contact.

3 Recommendation: A change in TO&E which would enable a 50 man infantry element would be a much more effective reaction force to handle most any situation.

(c) Cobra Tactics in VR

1 Observation: The AH-1G tactics must remain similar to the UH-1G in order to adequately provide cover for the scout elements.

2 Evaluation: The utilization of the AH-1G has proven most effective at a reasonably low altitude in order that immediate fire power can be placed under the OH-6A on treetop VR at any movement. At high altitude or above 1000' the Cobra cannot cover the movement of the OH-6A to provide immediate fire power.

3 Recommendation: The AH-1G be flown at 600' to 1000' when in the mission of VR with scout elements in order that fire power can be placed under or near the OH-6A at all times. The wing man can fly at higher altitudes and still provide back-up fire power when the lead aircraft starts a firing pass.

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(d) Utilization of FAC

1 Observation: The FAC requires an O-1 to adequately provide his capabilities to the Squadron.

2 Evaluation: The Squadron has attempted to utilize the FAC in the OH-6A and UH-1C with little success due to the necessity of the FAC to be at a higher altitude to accomplish his mission.

3 Recommendation: The FAC should be provided an O-1 to accomplish his mission in support of the Squadron.

(e) Aircraft Congestion

1 Observation: There are far too many aircraft in close proximity to ground units conducting operations especially when in contact.

2 Evaluation: On numerous occasions when the cav troops were supporting ground elements, the number of aircraft to include as many as 4 scouts, 6 Cobras, and 6 C&C aircraft in a small confined orbit over the elements in contact almost proved disastrous.

3 Recommendations: An SOP should be established to separate type aircraft by altitude restrictions. The scout aircraft are normally on the troops with fire teams working in an orbit zone of 600' to 1100'. All C&C aircraft to include Squadron, Division and higher should remain at an altitude above the orbiting fire teams to insure adequate separation is maintained.

(f) UHF Capability for Squadron TOC

1 Observation: There are no provisions in the Squadron TOC for a UHF capability.

2 Evaluation: The Squadron TOC has a requirement for a UHF capability for operations. Presently the only communication in the TOC is FM. The Troop and Squadron Commanders utilize FM with the ground units they are supporting. The necessity for the Squadron TOC to communicate on UHF with the Troop Commanders is on operations in order that continuous communications exist.

3 Recommendation: Action be taken to procure the AN/MRC 107 or 108 for issue to the Squadron down to troop level in operation centers.

(g) Dual FM Capability on the UH-1C

1 Observation: There is a definite requirement for a dual FM capability in the TO&E UH-1C aircraft for Troop Commanders.

2 Evaluation: The Troop and Squadron Commanders have a definite requirement to have a dual FM capability to monitor ground elements as well as unit command. The AN/ASC 10 & 11 is available for the

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C&C aircraft UH-1H but there is no existing console for UH-1C aircraft. The present safety limits for gross weight prohibits the utilization of the AN/ASC 10 & 11 in the UH-1C. The Air Cavalry Squadron has UH-1C aircraft for the TO&E C&C capabilities.

2 Recommendation: An additional AN/ARC 54 be provided for the C&C aircraft in the Squadron in lieu of AN/ASC 10 or 11. Recommend that the modification of the existing console be researched to enable the utilization within weight limitations on the UH-1C.

(3) Training

(a) Aerial Observer Training

1 Observation: A lack of trained aerial observers to fly in OH-6A scout elements.

2 Evaluation: The Squadron was not able to acquire school trained aerial observers to fly in the scout platoons. Personnel had to be taken with infantry MOS's and trained to fill this capacity.

3 Recommendation: Action should be taken to insure an MOS is established which qualifies observers so that a unit preparing for overseas movement can obtain already school qualified personnel.

(b) Training Prior to Movement

1 Observation: Adequate training statoside was not accomplished due to the lack of equipment, personnel, and experience.

2 Evaluation: The Squadron did not have all the personnel and equipment available to conduct appropriate training while preparing for move at Fort Knox.

3 Recommendation: Units preparing for overseas movement should have 50 to 60 days to become organized and receive all TO&E equipment and personnel. Time should be utilized to adequately prepare equipment for movement while fulfilling minimum training such as POR/POM qualifications. The unit should be allowed to conduct their necessary combat training upon arrival in Vietnam where they will have all their necessary personnel and equipment. A great deal more could be obtained during a training period by allowing this to take place in Vietnam where climate, terrain and conditions in general are actual.

(c) In-Country Training

1 Observation: In-country training is not adequate in most cases.

2 Evaluation: Most units assigned the responsibility for in-country training a new unit do not give adequate training to assist the

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new personnel. Consequently, a new unit learns the hard way upon becoming operational. The majority of the unit pilots reported to training units only to find they would be placed in an aircraft and fly the scheduled mission. No indoctrination on flight procedures, safety instruction or standardization rules were given in some cases. The OH-6A pilots received no indoctrination for their type aircraft or mission.

2 Recommendation: Action should be taken to insure adequate classroom instruction be conducted for all pilots as well as standardization rides and in-country flight training.

(d) Conduct of Training upon Arrival

1 Observation: All personnel arriving in country were scheduled for training immediately upon arrival with host units.

2 Evaluation: All enlisted personnel were sent to in-country indoctrination as well as all pilots to their transition and in-country training. This left no personnel behind to receive all incoming equipment and aircraft as well as prepare for the operational date.

3 Recommendation: Personnel should arrive two weeks prior to equipment and aircraft. This would enable all in-country training to be completed prior to arrival of all necessary equipment for operational status. All attempts could then be directed to meeting the operational date.

(e) OH-6A Pilot Transition

1 Observation: The shortage of OH-6A qualified personnel is critical.

2 Evaluation: The Squadron cannot adequately train new pilots for the OH-6A and still perform their tactical mission due to the committed number of pilots available to fly missions and the inability to pull SIP and IP personnel to train these pilots.

3 Recommendation: Request personnel be trained at a centrally located school set up to only transition pilots into the OH-6A. New Pilots could then be sent to units to fly operational missions in that type aircraft where they could learn tactical operations of the OH-6A in combat conditions. Upon completion of training, pilots could be transferred back to their assigned units or be infused with the unit they are training with to assist in adjusting DEROS.

(4) Intelligence: None

(5) Logistics

(a) TO&E Modifications

1 Observation: The present TO&E is not adequate for the 7/1 ACS.

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2 Evaluation: The requirement for additional personnel and equipment is an absolute necessity for the operation of the Squadron.

3 Recommendation: Action be taken to adopt the present MTO&E 17-98 submitted through 12th Combat Aviation Group.

(b) Maintenance Support for the AH-1G

1 Observation: The present organization of an Air Cav Troop seriously limits maximum effectiveness of the AH-1G.

2 Evaluation: When the AH-1G replaced the UH-1C aircraft the elimination of the door gunners reduced the rearming and weapons maintenance effectiveness on the aircraft. The weapons systems on the Cobra require additional personnel over and above the assigned crew chief to assist in rearming as well as maintaining the systems. Also required is an airfield service section with a 1200 gallon tanker to enable the weapons platoon to refuel while running instead of utilizing the miniport facilities. This creates a hazard due to the fact that there is not a crew chief or gunner available to refuel the aircraft while it is running. The co-pilot must climb over the throttle and out of the aircraft to refuel which creates a serious safety problem.

3 Recommendation: A T&E augmentation should be authorized to include the additional personnel, vehicle and special tools to maintain the weapons system.

- a 1-1200 gallon tanker
- b 2-POL Specialists
- c 3-Ammo Specialists
- d 2-Armorers

(c) Unsatisfactory Battery Performance

1 Observation: Batteries continued to overheat on vehicles.

2 Evaluation: This unit experienced numerous problems with vehicle batteries overheating upon arrival in country.

3 Recommendation: The Squadron learned after investigating the situation that the specific gravity of the battery has to be lowered to perform correctly in this environment.

(d) Vehicle Carburetors

1 Observation: Many of the Squadron vehicles developed carburetor difficulties during their initial operation.

2 Evaluation: It appears that the engine preservatives used to prepare the vehicles for overseas shipment is the cause of the small rubber diaphragm being perforated allowing excessive amounts of air to enter the carburetor.

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2 Recommendation: A lighter preservative be used on the carburetor as this item is in short supply in Vietnam.

(6) Organization: None

(7) Other

(a) Multiple Detonator Box

1 Observation: Delta Troop has improvised a detonator box for claymore mines which has proved itself successful on numerous occasions for night ambush patrols.

2 Evaluation: This multiple detonator box has been utilized by Delta Troop on almost all their night ambush patrols. Their success as depicted by their results has been outstanding in the use of this box. The detonator is selective in that individual banks are wired in on each killing zone and by switch selection the platoon commander or platoon sergeant can be responsive to the observations of the point man.

3 Recommendation: The Squadron has incorporated utilization of this device on all night ambush patrols to insure a maximum effective kill zone for ambush sites in the use of claymore mines. See Inc 5.

5 Inclosures

1-Significant Activities

2-Cumulative Losses

3-After Action Report

4-After Action Report

5-Fabricating of Multiple Detonator Box

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AVGC-SC (14 May 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 1st
Air Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR -
65 (RI)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 12TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP. APO 96266 22 May 1968

TO: Commanding General, II FFORCEV, APO 96266

1. In compliance with AR 525-15 and USARV Regulation 525-15, one copy of subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and the following comments are made:

a. Reference page 12, item 2(a): The air cavalry squadron is an effective fighting organization providing the commander with superior screening, intelligence, and reconnaissance capabilities. Any piecemeal commitment of any element of the squadron will reduce the capabilities of the squadron or individual troops. Only under extreme tactical emergencies should fire teams be given missions to support units other than elements within the squadron.

b. Reference page 12, item 2(b): The rifle platoon in the air cavalry squadron is presently composed of a platoon headquarters, a lift section and four rifle squads of nine (9) men each. This 36 man infantry element is tailored with lift support within the platoon and is a mobile, effective fighting unit. An air cavalry squadron MNC is presently being written. Representatives from each of the three air cavalry squadrons in Vietnam were present at recent MNC meetings. This area was discussed and the above conclusion was agreed upon.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

James E. Lybrand
JAMES E. LYBRAND
Major, Infantry
Asst Adjutant

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Inclosure 3 (After Action Report) to Operational Report Lessons Learned
for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968.

On 21 April 1968, D Troop, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry received the mission of setting up a night ambush at co-ordinates XT946311, approximately 17,000 meters south of Phouc Vinh.

Due to another mission requiring one platoon, the Commanding Officer of D Troop, Major Richard A. Thompson, had only two platoons available for the ambush.

These two platoons were air lifted by A and B Troop lift sections of the 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry to a landing zone at co-ordinates XT943312, approximately 300 meters from the ambush site. The landing zone was secured by the rifle platoon of A Troop, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry.

From this landing zone, the unit moved into the surrounding woodline and set up security while certain key personnel reconnoitered the ambush site. After a thorough examination of the immediate area, (NOTE: See ambush site. the final ambush site was selected. Major considerations in choosing this particular position were likely avenues of approach, fields of fire and defensibility.

After the exact site was chosen, the remainder of the unit moved into the site and began to improve the available cover and concealment. A great deal of care was taken in digging in, due to the distance of the ambush site from other friendly positions.

In preparing the ambush site, three man positions were dug to insure maximum control, security and dispersion of available firepower. Each position contained at least one M79-40MM grenade launcher. Automatic weapons were placed in positions which allowed for maximum coverage of the kill zone and areas of approach and withdrawal. Observation posts were utilized until these positions were completed.

Two separate areas were selected as the most probable kill zone. One of these was the main trail to the south of friendly positions, the other was a small footpath running along the woodline to the east of friendly positions.

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AVFBC-RE-H (14 May 68) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for
Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RL) (U) (UIC: WGZ6AA)

DA, HQ II WFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 5 JUN 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375


Commander, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This command has reviewed the attached Operational Report - Lessons
Learned of the 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry and concurs with it.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



O. B. FORY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVBA-C (14 May 68) 3d Ind

JUL 6 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
for Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RL) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375
Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

I. (C) This headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be
adequate, and concurs with the contents as indorsed except for the following:

a. Paragraph 2a(2)(a), page 12 and paragraph 2a 1st Ind. Nonconcur.

(1) The squadron can, and in fact must, continue its VR mission even
though its weapons are employed elsewhere at any given time. When a fire
team is dispatched by a unit to assist another unit in contact, the
capability of the cavalry troop to conduct VR is reduced but certainly not
eliminated. Scout ships can adequately conduct VR at tree top level and
develop a situation without the organic fire teams at altitude working
directly as a team. Scout teams must be trained in and must practice low
level navigation to properly accomplish this. Other means of developing
a situation are available such as artillery, tactical air and organic
cavalry squadron mortars. Flexibility is a must in air cavalry operations
and set patterns of employment should be avoided.

(2) It is agreed that the capability and flexibility of the air
cavalry squadron is reduced when its organic elements are fragmented away
to other units. The air cavalry squadron is most effective when employed
as a squadron with all of its organic elements and a reconnaissance and
security mission. The frequently encountered problem of the OPCON
commander fragmenting the cavalry units can be reduced by a continuing
educational process conducted by the cavalry commanders themselves,
acting as the OPCON commander's special staff officer on reconnaissance
and security.

b. Paragraph 2a(2)(b), page 12. Nonconcur.

Although the rifle platoon in the air cavalry troop is not a large
enough force to commit as a ground element in many cases, it can also be
said that "a rifle battalion is not a large enough force to commit as
a ground element in many cases". A change in TOE which would authorize
a 50 man rifle platoon would undoubtedly increase the capability to a
degree, however such an authorization would also require additional

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AVRA-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
for Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

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organic lift, additional aircrews to operate the aircraft, and additional maintenance personnel. Additionally, it would require the platoon leader to exercise command and control over an additional rifle squad. Rifle platoons throughout the Army are standardized at four squads each which, experience has proven, is optimum for a platoon leader's span of control. If the squadron elements are employed as the TOE intends, i.e. as a squadron, rather than fragmented, the squadron commander has the capability to tailor his rifle task force for a specific mission with up to three organic rifle platoons from the air cavalry troops, and if required three platoon sized elements from the cavalry troop. The mission of the cavalry squadron or troop is not normally to stand and fight, but to find the enemy, maintain contact and/or develop the situation and provide time and information for the OPCON commander to react with other fire power and maneuver elements.

c. Paragraph 2a(2)(e), page 13. Nonconcur with recommendation. The air mission commander is responsible for maintaining control of the aviation assets in his area of operation. He has the option of assigning altitudes to participating aircraft in order to preclude interference with one another. An SOP which would fix the altitude for various types of aircraft would not allow for flexibility in the event scout ships and/or gunships were not operating in the area.

d. Paragraph 2a(3)(e), page 15. Nonconcur. Units must accept some of the responsibility of training their personnel.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 2a(2)(g), page 13. This headquarters has implemented a program to exchange the UH-1C helicopters in the squadron HHT and the headquarters of each of the air cavalry troops for UH-1H helicopters. When this exchange is completed each commander will have the UH-1H to be used as command and control aircraft thereby eliminating the current weight limitations on command consoles which exist when using the UH-1C for this mission. An MTOE which includes the above aircraft exchange is under consideration in this headquarters at this time.

b. Paragraph 2a(3)(a), page 14. This headquarters concurs with the recommendation, however, no school exists for training of aerial observers. Units are now required to train their own observers and each unit should have a continuous program for training replacements. Units can not rely on being provided with fully qualified personnel.

c. Paragraph 2a(3)(c), page 14. In country training is provided to indoctrinate new aviators in methods of performing tactical missions. Most units accomplish this by teaming the new aviators with experienced aviators during assigned missions. Standardization rides can not always be given nor can other training flights be scheduled due to the commitments of the unit conducting the training.

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AVBA-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
for Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS CSFUR-65) (RL) (U)

d. Paragraph 2a(5)(a), page 16. Recommended MTOE has been forwarded
by the 1st Aviation Brigade to USARV.

e. Paragraph 2a(5)(b), page 16. A standardized MTOE for Air Cavalry
Troops is being staffed at 12th Combat Aviation Group Headquarters which
will provide additional service personnel utilizing those spaces vacated
by gunners when conversion is made to the AH-1G.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



J. D SEGAL
1LT, AGC
ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

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AVHGC-DST (30 Apr 68) 4th Ind (C) CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 17 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP+DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning KD-RL team, page 11, paragraph 2a(1)(e): Concur. Force packages were developed to include direct support avionics and maintenance teams for deploying aviation units; however, in most cases, the aviation units were deployed before these avionics and maintenance support elements could be formed and trained. Avionics and maintenance teams are scheduled to arrive in RVN for these units.

b. Reference item concerning UHF capability for squadron TOC, page 13, paragraph 2A(2)(f). The proper UHF radio set for ground-to-air communications would be the AN/TRC-68, the fixed installation version of the AN/VRC-24. If requirement exists, unit should submit an MTQE action with full justification.

c. Reference item concerning dual FM capability on the UH-1C, page 13, paragraph 2a(2)(g): Concur. HQ USARV has developed a small console with 2 FM radios that weighs less than 100 pounds. The prototype has been completed. It is capable of accepting the KY-28 for secure voice operations if desired. The console can be adapted to the UH-1C. Recommend the 7/1st Cav officially request from HQ USARV this type console for use in the UH-1C. Request should contain complete justification and quantities required. Since the component will not become an installed or component part of the aircraft, special authorization from ACofS, G3, USARV, is required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ, 7/1st Air Cav
HQ, 1st Avn Bde

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GPOP-BT (14 May 68) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cav
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 AUG 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. Shortt

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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Inclosure 1 (Significant Activities) to Operational Report Lessons Learned for
Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968.

1. Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. There are no changes or additions to the unit mission.

b. Organization

Assigned Units	M/R VICINITY	UNIT LOCATION	APO
7th Sqdn, 1st Air Cavalry	WGZGAA	DI AN	96289
Headquarters Troop	WGZ6TO	DI AN	96289
A Troop (Air)	WGZ6A0	DI AN	96289
B Troop (Air)	WGZ6B0	DI AN	96289
C Troop (Air)	WGZ6C0	Vinh Long	96357
D Troop (Ground)	WGZ6D0	DI AN	96289

Attached Units/Sections

E Troop - Maintenance Detachment Personnel Section (Authorized by MTOE)	DI AN	96289
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c. Command:

(1) During the reporting period the following major changes in command and staff positions occurred.

(a) Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Canedy, 068937, assumed command of the Squadron upon activation 8 July 1967.

(b) On 14 March 1968 Major John W. White Jr., 02300795 assumed duties as Squadron S-4 replacing Major Floyd Campbell, 04044979.

(c) On 6 April 1968 Major Herschel B. Stephens, 0226931 assumed duties of Squadron Executive Officer replacing Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Mills, 096701.

(d) On 6 April 1968 Major John F. Glenn, 02292578 assumed command of Headquarters and Headquarters Troop replacing Major Herschel B. Stephens, 0226931.

(e) On 9 April 1968 Captain John M. Bostdorf, 093127 assumed duties as Squadron Safety Officer replacing First Lieutenant Stanley o. Orrock, 05713338.

(2) The following are personnel occupying major command staff positions.

(a) LTC Charles E. Canedy, 068937	Squadron Commander
(b) MAJ Herschel B. Stephens, 0226931	Squadron Executive Officer
(c) CPT Stanley S. Fracker III, OF101442	S-1
(d) CPT Charles R. M. Chiaroli, OF101570	S-2
(e) MAJ Albert F. Rodriguez, 02102995	S-3
(f) MAJ John W. White Jr., 02300795	S-4
(g) CPT Anthony S. Alaimo Jr., 05255854	Flight Surgeon
(h) CPT John M. Bostdorf, 093127	Safety Officer
(i) MAJ Harold Johnson, 091888	Maintenance Officer
(j) MAJ John F. Glenn, 02292578	CO, HHT
(k) MAJ James R. Hill, 072483	CO, Trp A
(l) MAJ William E. Boaty, OF109512	CO, Trp B

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(m) MAJ Arthur L. Finch, 087515
 (n) MAJ Richard A. Thompson, 091402

CO, Trp C
 CO, Trp D

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d. Unit Strength

(1) Military

SUBORDINATE	OFFICER	WO	EN	TOT/ L.
UNIT	AUTH O/H	AUTH O/H	AUTH O/H	AUTH O/H
HMT	23	22	7	181
A Trp	18	15	30	121
B Trp	18	16	30	121
C Trp	18	16	30	121
D Trp	5	4	0	127
7/1 ACS	82	73	97	681
				656
				850
				812

(2) Civilian

SUBORDINATE	TECH REPS	AMERICAN CIVILIAN	VN	3D NET	CONTRACTOR
UNITS	AUTH O/H	AUTH O/H	AUTH O/H	AUTH O/H	O/H O/H
HMT	2	2	10	10	0 0
A Trp	0	0	0	5	0 0
B Trp	0	0	0	5	0 0
C Trp	0	0	0	5	0 0
D Trp	0	0	0	5	0 0
7/1 ACS	2	2	10	10	0 0
				30 30	0 0
				0	0 0

(3) Overall assigned/attached strength increased during the reporting period as follows:

Date	Officer	Warrant Officer	Enlisted Men
15 Aug 67 (POSD)	12	29	396
30 Sep 67	74	85	543
31 Oct 67	75	85	577
30 Nov 67	73	83	567
31 Dec 67	75	87	570
23 Jan 68 (PRD)	74	88	580
29 Feb 68	75	90	574
31 Mar 68	77 + 1	88	639 + 83
30 Apr 68	74 + 1	86	661 + 83

e. Aircraft Authorized and On Hand: See Tab A

f. Cumulative Results: See Tab B

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Tab A (Lircraft Authorized and On Hand) to Incl 1 to Operational Report Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1968.

Subordinate Unit	UH-1C(A) Auth O/H	UH-1H Auth	UH-1G Auth	CH-6A Auth	UH-1D Auth	Total Auth O/H
HHT	5	4	2	0	0	7
A Trp	2	2	6	9	10	27
B Trp	2	2	6	9	10	27
C Trp	2	2	6	2	10	27
7/1 LCS	11	10	20	27	30	88

N 1 AHG Fleet
N 1 UHD Fleet

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Inclosure 5 (Fabrication of Multiple Detonator Box) to Operational Report
Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

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I. The following parts are required:

- a. Switch, toggle FSN 5930-108-6942 1 each
- b. Switch, toggle FSN 5930-189-0786 1 each
- c. Terminal FSN 5940-223-5293 4 each
- d. Battery, Dry BA26 FSN 6135-120-1023 1 each
- e. Container, Any container that will house all components. A strong, tight metal container is preferable.

2. PURPOSE. To provide sufficient power to detonate 10 each claymore mines simultaneously with one switch.

3. THEORY OF OPERATION:

A 45 potential is applied to a spring loaded toggle switch. When the switch is in the normal position no power is applied to the circuit. When the switch is pulled to the "fire" position, power is applied through a switch which selects one bank of 10 each claymores at a time. When the switch is released it automatically returns to the spring loaded or "safe" position.

After firing one bank, the selector switch can be thrown to the other position and the other bank detonated in the same manner.

The type of battery used is optional. The only requirement is that it have approximately 45 volts to overcome the resistance of the extension between the detonator box and the terminal box which the claymores are attached. As a rule of thumb the larger the battery, the more reliable the operation.

The Army Supply System offers many different parts that will serve the purpose. Any parts that will meet the basic requirements of the attached diagrams will be sufficient to fabricate the multiple detonator.

Because of the multitude of combinations that are possible, an actual test with the finished product utilizing claymore wire and blasting caps will determine the overall efficiency of the system.

TAB A
TAB B

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Tab B (Cumulative Results) to Operational Report of 7th Armored Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS ~~Series~~ 65 (R1)

UNIT	SORTIES	TROOPS LIFTED	CARGO TNS	IN KIL. (BC)	STRUCTURES DEST	S. AIRPLANS		AIRCRAFT DEST	AIRCRAFT TEST
						DAM	DEST		
HIT	3936	160	1	5	11	54	3	0	3 0
A Trp	3127	2023	33	48	127	200	7	11	9 2
B Trp	5356	1560	0	46	97	97	22	4	
C Trp	2699	4403	1	173	15	69	3	26	22 0
D Trp	0	0	0	37	0	5	0	0	0 0
7/1 ACS	15118	8146	35	309	153	425	13	114	56 6

AIRCRAFT BY TYPE

OH6A Destroyed	6
OH6A Damaged	39
UH1H Damaged	1
UH1C Damaged	14
LEL G Damaged	2
TOTAL	62

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Inclosure 2 (Cumulative Losses) to Operational Report Lessons Learned for
Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

FROM ARRIVAL 26 Feb - to 30 Apr 68

DMCS	KILLED IN ACTION	WOUNDED IN ACTION	RETURNED TO DUTY
062E	1	7	5
11B2F	1	4	3
11B20	1	4	3
11D40	1	10	9
67N20	1	2	1
67V20	1	5	3
71P20	1	0	0
94B20	1	3	2
11D10	0	3	4
11B10	0	8	7
36K40	0	1	1
67W20	0	1	1
61204	0	8	7
1980	0	1	1
1204	0	2	2
67N30	0	2	2
11D20	0	4	1
05B20	0	2	1
31B20	0	2	1
94B40	0	1	1
11C20	0	1	1
11B40	0	1	1
67A10	0	1	1
1203	0	1	1
11H20	0	2	0
TOTAL	8	76	57

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Inclosure 3 (After Action Report) to Operational Report Lessons Learned
for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968.

On 21 April 1968, D Troop, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry received the mission of setting up a night ambush at co-ordinates XT946511, approximately 17,000 meters south of Phouc Vinh.

Due to another mission requiring one platoon, the Commanding Officer of D Troop, Major Richard A. Thompson, had only two platoons available for the ambush.

These two platoons were air lifted by A and B Troop lift sections of the 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry to a landing zone at co-ordinates XT943312, approximately 300 meters from the ambush site. The landing zone was secured by the rifle platoon of A Troop, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry.

From this landing zone, the unit moved into the surrounding woodline and set up security while certain key personnel reconnoitered the ambush site. After a thorough examination of the immediate area, (NOTE: See ambush site. the final ambush site was selected. Major considerations in choosing this particular position were likely avenues of approach, fields of fire and defensibility.

After the exact site was chosen, the remainder of the unit moved into the site and began to improve the available cover and concealment. A great deal of care was taken in digging in, due to the distance of the ambush site from other friendly positions.

In preparing the ambush site, three man positions were dug to insure maximum control, security and dispersion of available firepower. Each position contained at least one M79-40MM grenade launcher. Automatic weapons were placed in positions which allowed for maximum coverage of the kill zone and areas of approach and withdrawal. Observation posts were utilized until these positions were completed.

Two separate areas were selected as the most probable kill zones. One of these was the main trail to the south of friendly positions, the other was a small footpath running along the woodline to the east of friendly positions.

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Inclosure 3 continued

After the completion of all three main positions, claymore mines were set out to allow for maximum coverage of the kill zone and the surrounding area. Claymores were also used along the entire perimeter for security purposes. In the rear of the main bank of claymores, a second bank was set up. This second bank, if properly employed, is security against an immediate counter-attack by the enemy. It also precludes the need of any extensive shifting of positions or defenses after contact is made.

In setting up the claymore mines along the kill zone, D Troop utilized a system which allowed one key man to blow up to 20 claymores simultaneously. The firing device was an electrical system developed after it was found by the leaders within the troop that a simultaneous explosion of claymores along the kill zone is extremely difficult to obtain when fired on command by separate individuals.

After claymores were set out, anti-personnel mines were placed in holes and along likely avenues of withdrawal which bordered the kill zone.

The preparation of the ambush site was completed on or about 1330 hours. At that time, all personnel were rebriefed on actions on contact and the movement ceased.

Defensive concentrations were fired after the hours of darkness into likely avenues of approach and withdrawal by the artillery forward observer attached to D Troop, 2LT William A. Striplin. These fires were completed on or about 2100 hours.

On or about 0030 hours, on 22 April 1968, SSGE6 Johann G. Mailinger, who was manning a listening post at the south-east corner of the ambush reported that an enemy force was entering the kill zone which bordered the eastern edge of the ambush to his platoon leader, 1LT David M. Dial. The size of the force was not known at that time, but it was ascertained that it was quite large. The enemy continued to move north and the lead element of the force was spotted by 1LT Dial after it had advanced to the center of the kill zone. Sergeant Mailinger continued to send reports concerning the number of enemy. 1LT Dial observed the enemy's movement and allowed the lead element to advance until it was at the northern most edge of the kill zone. At this time, members of the enemy force were still south of the kill zone. When the lead element reached the northern most edge of the kill zone, 1LT Dial activated the claymore firing device, which simultaneously exploded ten claymore mines along the kill zone. Another ten claymores were held in reserve by 1LT Dial to be command detonated if the need arose. Immediately after the execution of the ambush, 40MM grenades and hand grenades were fired into the kill zone and the wood line to the east of the kill zone. At this time, Sergeant Mailinger also detonated six claymore mines at the southern edge of the kill zone and fired 40MM grenades into the area. He also brought fire on members of the enemy force who were still outside the kill zone to prevent them from deploying and bringing effective fire on friendly positions.

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Inclosure 3 continued

When 2LT Striplin heard the first claymores being fired, he immediately called for artillery illumination and warned the Fire Direction Center to prepare to fire high explosive into the preplanned concentration to the east of friendly positions. Major Thompson reported the contact to Squadron Operations and requested gun ships.

After the initial volley was fired, 1LT Dial gave the signal to cease fire. Movement was heard in and along the woodline bordering the kill zone and fires were again placed on that area. 2LT Striplin called for one fire for effect into the woodline at this time. By this time, artillery illumination had been adjusted and was in the area. This illumination was supplemented by hand held flares.

1LT Dial again gave the command to cease fire and listened for movement. When no movement was heard, 1LT Dial called for his search team and accompanied it into the kill zone.

Upon entering the kill zone, the search team received sniper fire from survivors who had dragged themselves into the woodline. SP4 Kenneth W. Topolewski returned fire into one position, killing its occupant. At the same time, SP4 Edward F. Dermeyer fired into another position killing its occupant. Shortly after these positions were neutralized, 1LT Dial noticed that one of the enemy in the kill zone was alive and was attempting to remove a hand grenade from his pistol belt. 1LT Dial killed this man with his bayonet before he had a chance to throw the grenade.

As the search team moved through the kill zone, they removed all explosives and weapons from the enemy bodies. Upon entering further into the kill zone, more fire was received. This position was neutralized by Major Thompson, who had joined the search team. At approximately the same time 1LT Dial moved to the northern edge of the kill zone and killed another individual who was attempting to run into the woodline.

At the same time the search team was out in the primary kill zone, Sergeant Mailinger was conducting a search of the area to his front with two of his men, SP4 Michael C. Darcy, and SGT Thomas D. Gravell. Upon leaving his position, Sergeant Mailinger was fired on from a clump of brush by a wounded NVA. He neutralized this position with a burst of fire from his M-16. He then continued to search the area with his team. After this initial search, the bodies and weapons were pulled back toward friendly lines to prevent the enemy from dragging them off if further heavy contact ensued. Due to a lapse in artillery illumination the search teams were pulled back before they could conduct a search of the woodline to the east of the kill zone. After this first search, a count of the bodies was taken in each area. There were eight bodies at 1LT Dial's position, six at Sergeant Mailinger's and one in the 2nd platoon area along the southern boundary of friendly positions. This man had been killed by SGT Robert J. Malinowski after he had run out of the kill zone in an effort to escape.

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Inclosure 3 continued

After receiving a body count, Major Thompson sent a situation report to the Squadron Commander, LTC Charles E. Cenedy Jr., who was in route to the ambush site in his aircraft. Major Thompson also requested a resupply of claymore mines, 40MM ammunition and hand held flares at this time. While this communication was taken place 2LT Striplin was calling for artillery fires on the woodline to the east of the ambush site in order to neutralize renewed sniper fire. As the first round of artillery landed, Colonel Cenedy closed the area of the ambush end, noting that the artillery was ineffective placed suppressive fires into the woodline from his aircraft. No further fire was received for quite some time.

With enemy fire suppressed and artillery illumination in the area again, another search team was taken into the kill zone to retrieve any other bodies and weapons which could be found. No fire was received by friendly troops during this second search. Three more bodies were discovered in 1LT Dial's area. One of these has been killed by anti-personnel mines which were placed in a fox hole, he had attempted to take cover in. Another VC was killed by 1LT Dial and SGT Gravell when he attempted to fire on members of the search team.

Finding nothing more in the area and in an attempt to conserve artillery illumination, further search of the area was postponed until daylight.

While the second search was taking place, Colonel Cenedy had led resupply ships into the area. The claymores which were brought in were put out to replace those blown during the ambush and 40MM ammunition and hand held flares were redistributed.

With all original claymores and ammunition replaced, the unit reassumed its original posture of readiness. The time was approximately 0200 hours. 2LT Striplin continued to call for intermittent illumination throughout the remainder of the night and Colonel Cenedy circled the area continuously except for short breaks to refuel. During these breaks, Major Albert F. Rodriguez, the Squadron S-3, replaced Colonel Cenedy in his own gun ship to insure that the ground unit had constant immediate fire support in the area.

No further contact was made and at daybreak 1LT Dial made a complete sweep of the area with his unit. This sweep uncovered one more enemy dead. Aircraft hovering the area also found another body.

The unit was extracted at 0815 hours on 22 April 1968, after a thorough search of the bodies was completed and all weapons, ammunition and documents were forwarded to higher headquarters.

As a result of this ambush, the NVA forces involved sustained a confirmed 20 dead and an unknown number of wounded. Eleven AK-47 automatic rifles and one 9MM Chinese Communist pistol were captured.

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Inclosure 3 continued

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In addition to this, approximately 40 hand grenades and other miscellaneous military equipment were captured by D Troop. It is unknown but estimated that approximately 40 enemy personnel were in or around the ambush site. Due to the prompt and accurate suppressive fires supplied by both artillery and organizational aircraft, D Troop sustained no casualties.

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The map illustrates a combat area with various units and their positions. Key elements include:

- Legend:**
 - △ LP
 - ← MACHINE GUN
 - ← SMALL ARMS
 - (CLAYMORE
 - FOXHOLE W/AP MINE
- Units and Positions:**
 - 3 71 (with a small square icon)
 - D D 6 71 (-) (with a small square icon)
 - 2-D 90 7-1 (with a small square icon)
- Terrain and Features:**
 - Wavy lines representing water or rivers.
 - A dashed line representing a boundary or road.
 - Scale markers: 30M, 70M, and 100M.
 - Numbers 1 through 10 indicating specific locations or landmarks.
 - A compass rose at the top right.
- Bottom Label:** TO HIGHWAY 16

- ⑧ COMMAND DETONATED CLAYMORES FROM 36 POSITION
- ⑨ COMMAND DETONATED CLAYMORES FROM 26 POSITION
- ⑩ - ⑭ KILLED BY CLAYMORE
- ⑮ KILLED LEAVING KILL ZONE
- ⑯ KILLED BY AP HINE
- ⑰ KILLED BY SECOND SEARCH TEAM
- ⑱ - ⑲ FOUND ON MORNING SWEEP
- ⑳ FOUND BY AIRCRAFT

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Inclosure 4 (After Action Report) to Operational Report Lessons Learned
for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968.

On 24 April 1968, D Troop, 7th Sqdn, 1st Av Cavalry, received the mission of setting up a night ambush at co-ordinates XT942299.

Two platoons were used to establish the ambush. One platoon was still open to 2-18th Infantry at the water plant (XT947002).

These two platoons were air lifted at 241745 by A and B Troop lift sections into a landing zone at co-ordinates XT937300, approximately 300 meters from the ambush site. The landing zone was not prepared by any type of fire. The Squadron did execute a fake insert approximately 1200 meters northeast, at co-ordinates XT946311. This fake insert was covered by preparatory fires from Squadron gun ships.

While the fake insert was in progress, the actual ambush site was being prepared.

Two separate areas were selected as primary kill zones, one of these was a well used foot path running northwest-southeast and located 30 meters to the northwest of the ambush site; the other was a rubber plantation road running northwest-southeast and located 30 meters northeast of the ambush site. See Tab A.

The preparation of the ambush site was completed at approximately 1915 hours. Defensive concentrations had been designated and the data was being applied to the artillery guns when the listening post on the west corner of the ambush site reported an enemy force approaching the kill zone from the southeast. 1LT David M. Dial had control of the command detonated claymore mines in that kill zone and he allowed the enemy to advance to the north edge of the kill zone. There were 9 VC in the group, but due to their dispersion, about 15 meters between individuals, only 6 VC were in the kill zone when 1LT Dial detonated the claymores at 1930 hours. The 3 surviving VC apparently ran around to the northeast side of the ambush under cover of the dust and smoke created by the claymores. They threw 4 hand grenades at the northeast side of the ambush site and withdrew to the northeast under heavy 40MM grenade launcher fire from members of the 1st platoon occupying that side of the ambush triangle.

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Inclosure 4 continued

Major Thompson ordered a cease fire and had artillery fired around the periphery of the ambush site. Upon completion of the artillery fires, illumination was fired by the artillery and aircraft flares were dropped from a Squadron helicopter which had been on stand-by at Di An for just this purpose. Helicopter gun ships, piloted by LTC Kennedy and members of A Troop's Weapons Platoon placed suppressive fires on the area from which the hand grenades were thrown by the VC.

After these actions were completed, the illumination from the helicopter flare ship was adjusted over the area and a search team was sent into the kill zone to search the bodies, recover any enemy weapons and drag the bodies out of the kill zone. This was accomplished in short order and the search team returned to their positions in the ambush site.

Two CH-6A's arrived at the site carrying a resupply of claymore mines and the blown claymores were replaced. When the ambush had been reestablished, illumination was stopped and the helicopter gun ships returned to Di An.

No further contact was made and a sweep of the area at daybreak was conducted with negative results.

Two platoons were extracted by helicopter at 250/30 April and returned to Di An.

The final results of this ambush included 6 VC killed BG, one M-2 carbine, serial No. 6852200, one .45 cal pistol, serial No. 231508, 4 hand grenades of U.S. manufacture, numerous documents, 6 make-shift packs containing cooking utensils, clothing etc.

Two members of the D Troop ambush patrol were very slightly wounded by grenade fragments.


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TAB A

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LIGHT
BROSH



⑦ ⑧
LIC BR

RUBBER PLANTATION ROAD

PRIMARY KILL ZONE

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→ MG
→ SMALL ARMS
→ → VC APPROACH RTE

• CLAYMORE MINES FIRED

① - THE 6 VC KILLED BY CLAYMORES

② + ③ - AP RECEIVED HAND GRENADES

FROM THESE LOCATIONS

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Inclosure 3 (Fabrication of Multiple Detonator Box) to Operational Report
Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

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1. The following parts are required:

- a. Switch, toggle FSN 5930-108-6942 1 each
- b. Switch, toggle FSN 5930-189-0786 1 each
- c. Terminal FSN 5940-223-5293 4 each
- d. Battery, Dry BA26 FSN 6135-120-1023 1 each
- e. Container, Any container that will house all components. A strong, tight metal container is preferable.

2. PURPOSE. To provide sufficient power to detonate 10 each claymore mines simultaneously with one switch.

3. THEORY OF OPERATION:

A 45 potential is applied to a spring loaded toggle switch. When the switch is in the normal position no power is applied to the circuit. When the switch is pulled to the "fire" position, power is applied through a switch which selects one bank of 10 each claymores at a time. When the switch is released it automatically returns to the spring loaded or "safe" position.

After firing one bank, the selector switch can be thrown to the other position and the other bank detonated in the same manner.

The type of battery used is optional. The only requirement is that it have approximately 45 volts to overcome the resistance of the extension between the detonator box and the terminal box which the claymores are attached. As a rule of thumb the larger the battery, the more reliable the operation.

The Army Supply System offers many different parts that will serve the purpose. Any parts that will meet the basic requirements of the attached diagrams will be sufficient to fabricate the multiple detonator.

Because of the multitude of combinations that are possible, an actual test with the finished product utilizing claymore wire and blasting caps will determine the overall efficiency of the system.

TAB A
TAB B


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
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TAB II

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TERMINAL BOARD



WIRING DIAGRAM



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TAB A

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SUBJECT: Pre-Fire Check for "Black Box"

1. Place claymores in desired locations
2. Locate terminal board in control area
3. Run spiral 4 cable from terminal board to control box
4. Connect terminal board and control box to spiral 4 cable
5. Insert indicator light in left bank
CAUTION: Light should not go on until the control box is set for proper bank and switch is in "fire" position. If light is on before this, condition malfunction exist.
6. After inserting light, control box should be set for band being tested. When switch is in "fire" position light should come on. If not, circuits are not working properly or wiring is incorrect.
7. After determining that one bank is working, the same procedure will be used for checking the other bank.
8. After insuring that banks work when the switch is in "fire" position, Remove indicator light from terminal board. LIGHT SHOULD NOT BE ATTACHED FOR ACTUAL FIRING.
9. Claymore wires can not be secured to terminal board.

POINTS TO REMEMBER:

1. Under normal conditions one bank is always ready to fire, depending on which position the selector switch is in.
2. Indicator light must be used to insure that power is only applied when switch is in "fire" position.
3. Light should only be used for short periods of time. Excess use of light will drain the battery.
4. When spiral 4 cable is used, the two BROWN wires should be used for one bank and the two WHITE wires for the other bank.

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ITEM 1

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** FOR OT RD # _____

***PAGE # _____

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE _____

FOR OT RD # _____

PAGE # _____

ITEM 3

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FOR OT RD # _____

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ITEM 5

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